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USE OF PRIOR CRIMES TO AFFECT CREDIBILITY AND
PENALTY IN PENNSYLVANIA *
It is a fundamental precept of the common law that the prosecution
may not introduce a defendant's unrelated prior crimes as substantive
evidence of his guilt of the present charge.' Thus the Commonwealth
may not argue that the defendant probably committed a particular crime in
1965 because he had engaged in criminal conduct in the past. While the
accused's record may be relevant for this purpose, it is inadmissible because
it is unduly prejudicial and may influence the jury far beyond its probative
value.2 Nevertheless, a person's criminal background may be introduced
for other limited purposes and thus ultimately reaches the jury. This Note
will explore the manner in which the courts of Pennsylvania have handled
the use of unrelated prior crimes.
I. CREDIBILITY
When a criminal defendant a or any witness testifies, the opposing
side may attack his credibility by introducing evidence of certain kinds of
prior misconduct. The theory is that a person who has committed a
crime or engaged in bad acts is less credible than someone who has not.4
A. Prior Misconduct Not Resulting in Conviction
1. Prior Bad Acts
The courts of Pennsylvania have generally not permitted inquiry into
prior bad acts-as opposed to convictions-to impeach a witness. Thus in
an early case it was held proper for the trial court to exclude the defendant's
* This Note is the first in the Revie-w's Pennsylvania Project, the purpose of
which is to observe and analyze the handling by the courts of Pennsylvania of issues
of particular importance to the Pennsylvania Bar, but also generally in need of
clarification 'or direction. Other Notes in this project will appear in future issues
of volume 113.
'See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); 1 WiMoRE, EViDENCE
§§57, 193 (3d ed. 1940).
2 See Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328, 332, 116 A.2d 867, 869
(1953); Commonwealth v. Dumber, 69 Pa. Super. 196, 200 (1918); 1 WIGMORE,
EviDENcE §§193-94 (3d ed. 1940).
3The common-law rule forbidding a criminal defendant to testify in his own
behalf was abolished by statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 681 (1964); see Com-
monwealth v. Doe, 79 Pa. Super. 162, 166-67 (1922).
4 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 682 (1964). A person convicted of perjury is
considered so unworthy of belief that he is forbidden to testify except under certain
circumstances. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 980 (3d ed. 1940).
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cross-examination of a prosecution witness as to whether she was conducting
a gambling and bawdy house and whether she was living with her husband.5
The court did not explain this limitation, but cited a case which clearly
indicated that this line of questioning was excluded because its prejudicial
effect outweighed any assistance to the jury in determining the weight to
be given to the testimony.6 The courts, however, have not reversed, as a
matter of course, when questions and answers were improperly permitted,
but have determined under the circumstances of each case whether such
errors were prejudicial. Thus in one case the court affirmed a conviction
despite improper questioning of the defendant's witness as to whether he
had "cut up" another person on the grounds that this question and its
denial were not prejudicial to the defendant.7 In a civil action in eject-
ment decided soon thereafter,8 a witness of the defendant was asked
whether he previously had lived with a woman who kept a house of
prostitution, and he answered in the affirmative. The supreme court
noted the impropriety of interrogating the defendant about an act for
which he had never been convicted, concluded that this questioning was
highly prejudicial 9 and awarded a new trial.
Although the courts themselves have not articulated the basis for
excluding evidence of prior bad acts for impeaching credibility, this rule
has the advantages of preventing confusion and unfair surprise. If the
trial becomes immersed in issues of whether or not the accused committed
a particular bad act, there is a risk of losing sight of the defendant's present
guilt as well as the possibility of an inordinate consumption of time.
Furthermore, it seems an unnecessary burden to require a defendant to
be prepared to refute every possible accusation about his past which the
prosecution might suddenly produce against him.10
2. Prior Arrests
Although the Pennsylvania courts have not always recognized a
distinction,:1 the use of prior arrests and indictments to impeach a defend-
ant presents different problems than does the use of prior bad acts. The
fact of arrest is likely to be a matter of public record and easy of proof,
thereby not raising collateral issues over the fact itself. However, since
innocent people are sometimes arrested and indicted, the fact of arrest or
indictment is of such limited probative value on the question of credibility
as to be outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice in the eyes of the jury.
5 Commonwealth v. Williams, 209 Pa. 529, 58 At. 922 (1904).
6 Commonwealth v. Payne, 205 Pa. 101, 104, 54 At. 489, 491 (1903).
7 Commonwealth v. Varano, 258 Pa. 442, 102 At. 131 (1917).
8 Marshall v. Carr, 271 Pa. 271, 114 At. 500 (1921).
Old. at 74, 114 At. at 502.
10 3 WIGMomE, EvmzxcE §§ 979-80 (3d ed. 1940).
11 See Commonwealth v. Arcurio, 92 Pa. Super. 404, 409-15 (1928).
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To go behind the mere fact of arrest and determine whether the defendant
did commit the crime for which he was arrested would again raise col-
lateral issues. 12
Thus the superior court declared early that arrests could not be
employed to affect credibility.13 However, there is dictum in Common-
wealth v. Doe'14 taking the opposite view, the court cited as authority
an older supreme court decision, Commonwealth v. Racco,'5 which in
dictum had quoted Underhill's Criminal Evidence for the proposition
that a defendant could be interrogated about his prior arrests, indictments,
and disorderly actions. Five years after Doe, the superior court, in
Commonwealth v. Arcurio,16 acknowledged that there was some confusion
of authority, but noted that a more recent edition of Underhill stated that
prior arrests should be excluded.17 The court proceeded to clarify
its position by holding that interrogation of a witness as to a previous
arrest to impeach his veracity was improper on the ground that innocent
people are often arrested. Since testimony of the impeached witness was
of great importance to the defendant's case, the court thought that the
accused may have been prejudiced, and it therefore reversed.
3. Guilty Pleas and Jury Verdicts
Guilty pleas and jury verdicts of guilty have also been held to be
inadmissible to affect credibility.' 8 While guilty pleas are a matter of
record, and it can be argued that innocent persons would rarely so plead,
the courts may be concerned over the possibility that coercion or mis-
understanding entered into the plea, thus beclouding the trial with a
collateral issue. In any event the courts have not articulated their
reasoning in excluding guilty pleas. Regarding the refusal to permit the
introduction of guilty verdicts, one court has asserted:
12 See Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 145 AtI. 89 (1928); Common-
wealth v. Waychoff, 177 Pa. Super. 182, 110 A.2d 780 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Mulroy, 154 Pa. Super. 410, 36 A.2d 337 (1943); Commonwealth v. Wiswesser, 124
Pa. Super. 251, 188 AtI. 604 (1936) ; cf. Berliner v. Schoenberg, 117 Pa. Super. 254,
178 At. 330 (1935) (reversible error to show that a prior civil action was dismissed
because plaintiff had engaged in a fraudulent practice). But see Commonwealth v.
Yeager, 329 Pa. 81, 196 AtI. 827 (1938). Compare Commonwealth v. Dillard, 313
Pa. 420, 169 Atl. 138 (1933) (permitting questioning of defendant about prior arrests).
In Dillard the accused testified that he had been beaten previously by the police at
a police station. The court allowed the interrogation to discredit this statement.
's See Commonwealth v. Keegan, 70 Pa. Super. 436, 439 (1918); Common-
wealth v. Williams, 41 Pa. Super. 326, 341 (1909) (harmless error).
14 79 Pa. Super. 162, 166-70 (1922) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Dietrich, 65 Pa. Super.
599, 603-04 (1917).
15225 Pa. 113, 117, 73 Adt. 1067, 1068 (1909).
16 92 Pa. Super. 404 (1927).
17 Id. at 410-15.
Is Commonwealth v. Auerbach, 71 Pa. Super. 54, 57-58 (1919) (guilty plea);
American Bank v. Felder, 59 Pa. Super. 166, 170 (1915) (verdict of guilty); cf.
Commonwealth v. Terrizzi, 109 Pa. Super. 74, 76-77, 165 Atl. 757, 757-58 (1933)
(guilty plea admissible in absence of timely objection). Compare Commonwealth v.
Palarino, 168 Pa. Super. 152, 157, 77 A.2d 665, 667 (1951) (probation order held to
be a judgment of conviction).
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A conviction . . . is admissible because it tends to show the
defectiveness of the moral character of the witness in respect to
truthfulness, which is relevant to impeachment . . . . A ver-
dict of guilty, without more, stands on a different plane. The
most it establishes is that the jury believed the accused to be
guilty. But until sentence is pronounced the issue is not neces-
sarily closed; a new trial may be granted or judgment be arrested.
In either event the verdict goes for naught. It may injure the
witness in the estimation of the jury, just as in a less degree the
mere indictment of the witness would. But as evidence that the
moral character of the witness for truth is bad it is unreliable
because of its incompleteness. 19
A court's failure to impose judgment after a guilty verdict could mean
that a question of error has arisen and that the judge is at least considering
a new trial.
B. Prior Convictions
1. Standards of Admissibility
Since convictions are highly reliable and relatively incontrovertible
proof of misconduct and not likely to be forgotten by the criminal, problems
of innocence, collateral issues, and surprise are largely avoided. Penn-
sylvania courts accordingly have limited the impeachment of credibility by
prior misconduct to proof of convictions. However, since it is the under-
lying conduct rather than the fact of conviction which is relevant to
credibility,2 1 the convictions admissible for impeachment purposes have been
confined to felonies and to misdemeanors in the nature of crimen falsi.
22
a. Misdemeanors
The kinds of misdemeanors admissible are not clearly indicated by the
term crimen falsi although it apparently was applied at common law to
any crime which disqualified a person as a witness. 23  The term includes
'9 American Bank v. Felder, supra note 18, at 170-71.
20 3 WiGmopx, EviDENcE § 980 (3d ed. 1940); see Commonwealth v. Quaranta,
295 Pa. 264, 272, 145 Ati. 89, 93 (1928).
21 Thus it would make no difference how the defendant had pleaded. For cases
admitting pleas of notlo contendere, see Commonwealth v. Snyder, 408 Pa. 253, 182
A.2d 495 (1962) ; Commonwealth v. Albert, 169 Pa. Super. 318, 82 A2d 695 (1951).
22 E.g., Commonwealth v. Kostan, 349 Pa. 560, 37 A2d 606 (1944); Common-
wealth v. Gold, 155 Pa. Super. 364, 38 A.2d 486 (1944); see Commonwealth v.
Thompson, 389 Pa. 382, 133 A.2d 207, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 849 (1957) (rule applied
to court martial).
There is a statutory prohibition against introducing a witness' juvenile record
to impeach him. PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 11, §261 (1939) ; see Commonwealth v. John-
son, 402 Pa. 479, 167 A.2d 511 (1961); Holmes' Appeal, 175 Pa. Super. 137, 103
A2d 454, aff'd, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
23 See Commonwealth v. Mueller, 153 Pa. Super. 524, 34 A2d 321 (1943).
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misdemeanors involving fraud and falsehood or those which are "malum
in se" rather than "malum prohibitum," 24 and "a crime less than a felony,
that by its very nature tends to cast doubt on the veracity of one who
commits it." 25 More specifically, the courts have admitted convictions for
false representation to obtain names on a voting petition,26 obtaining money
under false pretenses,2 7 draft evasion 2 8 illegal possession of liquor,29 and
hit and run driving.30 The first two crimes involve elements of fraud and
deceit which are clearly relevant to veracity, but it is difficult to envisage
the last two as fitting within the term crimen falsi without including almost
every criminal act. Draft evasion may or may not involve credibility
depending on the particulars of the offense. If, for example, the offense
consisted of falsifications on registration forms, it would reflect on the
person's veracity, although failing to register at all could be a product of
a number of motives not pertinent to credibility, such as cowardice or lack
of patriotism. Therefore, in some situations the court should go behind
the generic appellation given to the past conviction to see whether the
defendant's actual conduct reflects upon his credibility. In the draft
evasion case there is no indication that this was done.
Misdemeanor convictions which have been rejected have included
unlawful possession and manufacture of liquor,31 intoxication,32 Internal
Revenue Code violations,as disorderly conduct, 34 assault and battery,
and adultery.3 6 Assault and battery and disorderly conduct seem irrele-
vant to credibility since they are often a characteristic merely of intem-
perance, and the same would seem true for intoxication and minor
24 Commonwealth v. Schambers, 110 Pa. Super. 61, 64, 167 Ati. 645, 646 (1933).
See Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 165 Pa. Super. 533, 69 A.2d 432 (1949) where the
court held inadmissible a conviction for delivery of coal without weighing it. The
opinion concluded by noting: "The offenses thus penalized were malum prohibitum
only. The record of summary conviction of a malum prohibitum offense, no intent
being involved, does not establish an infraction of the law which is crimen falsi or
involves moral turpitude.' Id. at 560, 69 A.2d at 435.
25 Commonwealth v. Mueller, 153 Pa. Super. 524, 528, 34 A.2d 321, 323 (1943).
26 Commonwealth v. Albert, 169 Pa. Super. 318, 324, 82 A2d 695, 698 (1951).
2 7 Commonvealth v. Vis, 81 Pa. Super. 384, 386 (1923).
23 Mathey v. Flory Milling Co., 283 Pa. 331, 334-35, 129 Atl. 109, 110 (1925)
(jury cautioned not to "punish" the plaintiff for his lack of patriotism).
29 Commonwealth v. Yeager, 329 Pa. 81, 196 Atl. 827 (1938).
80 Ibid.
31 Commonwealth v. Schambers, 110 Pa. Super. 61, 64, 167 Atl. 645, 646 (1933).
The court, in dictum, indicated that such offenses as forgery, perjury, subordination
of perjury, suppression of testimony by bribery or conspiracy to procure the absence
of a witness, barratry, and the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing would
be admissible. See Commonwealth v. Cauffiel, 97 Pa. Super. 202, 209-10 (1929).32 Commonwealth v. Kostan, 349 Pa. 560, 566, 37 A.2d 606, 609 (1944).
33 Commonwealth v. Hurt, 163 Pa. Super. 232, 237, 60 A.2d 828, 830 (1948).
34 Commonwealth v. Spanos, 153 Pa. Super. 547, 550-51, 34 A.2d 902, 903-04
(1943).
35 Zubrod v. Kuhn, 357 Pa. 200, 203-04, 53 A.2d 604, 605 (1947); Nowak v.
Orange, 349 Pa. 217, 218, 36 A.2d 781, 782 (1944); Commonwealth v. Hurt, 163
Pa. Super. 232, 237, 60 A.2d 828, 830 (1948).
36 Gerhart v. Gerhart, 162 Pa. Super. 252, 257, 57 A.2d 595, 597 (1948) (dictum).
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infractions of liquor laws. Adultery is a closer question, for arguably it
involves deceiving one's spouse as well as its sexual and consenual aspects.
On the other hand, criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code
should definitely be included within the phrase crimen falsi since fraud
and falsehood are almost certainly involved in such offenses. Thus,
although the standard of crimen falsi can be useful in determining crimes
pertinent to credibility, the courts have been somewhat haphazard in apply-
ing it to specific misdemeanors.
b. Felonies
Unlike misdemeanors, all felonies have been admitted because of their
infamous character.3 7 This rationale is unsatisfactory for it sidesteps the
central question of the relationship between veracity and felonious conduct.
If it cannot be asserted that all felonies are relevant to the propensity for
perjury, the standard available for classifying misdemeanors would be
more appropriate. This is essentially the position taken in the Uniform
Rules of Evidence for witnesses other than criminal defendants,38 but the
Pennsylvania appellate courts have never discussed or even mentioned
such an approach for determining the admissibility of felonies.
c. Similar Crimes
Despite the rule admitting only convictions of felonies and misde-
meanors in the nature of crimen falsi for the purpose of impeachment, the
superior court has, in addition, suggested a third category-that of offenses
similar to that charged in the instant indictment. This category would, of
course, be important only if the crimes were misdemeanors not falling
within the term crimen falsi.
Commonwealth v. Wiswesser,39 in which the defendant was charged
with aiding in a fraudulent conversion of public funds, was the first case to
note similar convictions as a distinct category. It was mentioned in the
context of a general discussion of the right to cross-examine a defendant
to impeach his veracity, but in this case no convictions were introduced
against the defendant. Even had similar crimes been admitted, they un-
doubtedly would have fallen within one of the other categories, because
the accused was here charged with fraud-a crime closely related to
credibility.
3 7Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 167 Pa. Super. 79, 74 A.2d 750 (1950); Common-
wealth v. Gold, 155 Pa. Super. 364, 371, 38 A.2d 486, 489 (1944).
3
8 UNIFORm RULE OF EvIDENcE 21: "Evidence of the conviction of a witness for
a crime not involving dishonesty or false statement shall be inadmissible for the
purpose of impairing his credibility . .. .
The rule would exclude prior convictions of a criminal defendant unless he
introduced evidence "solely for the purpose of supporting his credibility." Ibid.
39 124 Pa. Super. 251, 262, 188 Atl. 604, 610 (1936).
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Wiswesser cited two superior court cases for the proposition that
similar offenses are admissible to impeach credibility.40 Commonwealth
v. Burke 4l permitted the prosecution to cross-examine an accused about
crimes similar to that charged in the indictment, but the indictment was
for larceny, a felony.42 The court did not indicate the nature of the prior
crimes, but it seems reasonable to assume that offenses similar to larceny
would also be felonies. Furthermore, the court appeared to be using the
term "similar offenses" as a description of the prior crimes, rather than
as an independent category, since the court nowhere mentioned the tradi-
tional categories of felony and crimen falsi misdemeanors. In Common-
wealth v. Dietrich,43 the defendant, charged with the felony of statutory
rape,44 was asked about his plea of guilty to a similar charge before a
justice of the peace some years previously. This case is dubious authority
for the proposition in Wiswesser for two reasons. First, it is not clear
whether the defendant had been convicted of that earlier charge. Second,
the similar offense appears to have been the "forcible taking advantage"
of a female,4 5 probably a felony.
Nevertheless, in 1948 the superior court, in Commonwealth v. Hurt,4"
specifically listed similar crimes as a third category. The defendant was
charged with sodomy and contributing to the delinquency of minors.
However, the inclusion of this third category was dictum, since there was
no attempt to introduce similar sexual offenses to impeach the defendant's
credibility. For support Hurt cited a number of cases including Wis-
wesser and Commonwealth v. Schambers.4 7 In the latter the defendant
had been indicted for unlawful transportation and possession of intoxicat-
ing liquor. The court specifically held that prior convictions for unlawful
possession and manufacture of liquor could not be admitted to affect
credibility, because they were neither felonies nor misdemeanors in the
nature of crimen falsi. Thus this case directly posed the issue of a third
category of similar offenses; yet, it rejected the very proposition which
Hurt was asserting.48
The most recent case to deal with offenses similar to those charged
in the indictment was Commonwealth v. Albert,49 involving a defendant
accused of the misdemeanor of operating a lottery.50 He contended that
4 0 Commonwealth v. Burke, 74 Pa. Super. 320 (1920); Commonwealth v. Diet-
rich, 65 Pa. Super. 599 (1917).
4174 Pa. Super. 320 (1920).
42PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4807 (1963).
4865 Pa. Super. 599 (1917).
4 4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4721 (1963).
45 Commonwealth v. Dietrich, 65 Pa. Super. 599, 600 (1917).
46163 Pa. Super. 232, 237, 60 A.2d 828, 830 (1948).
47 110 Pa. Super. 61, 167 AtI. 645 (1933).
48 Id. at 63-64, 167 AtI. at 646; accord, Commonwealth v. Brown, 93 Pa. Super.
190 (1928).
49 198 Pa. Super. 489, 182 A.2d 77 (1962).
50 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4605 (1963).
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it was error to admit similar prior convictions, but the superior court
affirmed on the alternative grounds that the prosecution had a right to
use the prior convictions to contradict defendant's earlier testimony and
also to attack his credibility in general.' 1 Thus this case comes close to
a demonstration of how a series of miscitations can culminate into a holding
with all appearances of being established law.
These cases are certainly a departure from settled Pennsylvania law
on what crimes can be used to affect credibility. It has been noted above
that the courts have attempted to separate misdemeanors related to veracity
from those that are not. This third category not only blurs this distinction,
but also makes it more difficult to restrain the jury from using such con-
victions for purposes other than credibility. If the jury knows that a
defendant committed similar crimes in the past, it will be hard for them
to avoid using his record as substantive evidence of his guilt in the present
case. This is always a problem, but at least for crimen falsi misdemeanors
and probably also for felonies the court is assuming some connection with
credibility. The superior court either rejects this basic rationale or is
asserting that some misdemeanors do not bear on credibility except when
a defendant happens to be charged with a similar crime. It is difficult to
comprehend why a past crime's relevance to credibility should turn on
the nature of the present indictment when the basic theory of introducing
convictions is that certain criminal conduct in the past affects the likeli-
hood of one's truthfulness. The supreme court has never adopted this
third category, and the superior court itself does not always seem aware
of its existence.52 It is certainly an area where clarification is needed.
2. Use of Pardoned Convictions
In Commonwealth v. Quarantar after the defendant in his testimony
had placed his character into issue, the prosecution asked him about a
crime for which he had been pardoned. The court noted that a pardon
is "a remission of guilt" and "blots out the existence of guilt, so that, in
the eyes of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never com-
mitted the offense." 5 It indicated further that "society, after exacting its
toll in the first instance, when its responsible head subsequently extends
mercy, ought not to continue this form of incorporal punishment." 55
Nevertheless, the court abruptly reversed its train of thought, reasoning
that since his prior conviction still influenced the viewpoint of friends and
neighbors, the conviction may be shown along with the pardon.
5 1 Commonwealth v. Albert, 198 Pa. Super. 489, 492-93, 182 A.2d 77, 79-80
(1962).52 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 167 Pa. Super. 79, 74 A.2d 750 (1950);
Commonwealth v. Schambers, 110 Pa. Super. 61, 167 Atl. 645 (1933).
53 295 Pa. 264, 145 Ati. 89 (1928).
54Id. at 273-74, 145 At. at 93.
55 Id. at 274, 145 At. at 93; cf. Commonwealth v. Cannon, 386 Pa. 62, 123 A.2d
675, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 898 (1956); Commonwealth v. Smith, 324 Pa. 73, 187
Adt. 387 (1936).
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It is not clear from the opinion just why the viewpoint of "friends
and neighbors" was thought to be relevant. Such evidence may be
pertinent after a defendant, through character witnesses, has introduced
evidence of his good reputation, since the opinions of those in the com-
munity have traditionally been considered relevant to a defendant's reputa-
tion.58 However, there was no indication that the defendant in Quaranta
resorted to character witnesses to show his good reputation.
Another possible explanation is that "friends and neighbors" was
intended by the court to refer to the jury. If so, the court's rationale
seems falacious, for it implies, in effect, that the determining factor for
admitting such evidence will be whether it will influence the jury, despite
the presence of a public policy warranting its exclusion. Under this rea-
soning, such facts as the race, religion, or political beliefs of witnesses
could be introduced or stressed on the theory that, although otherwise
excludable, the jury would be likely to give such evidence weight. It would
be difficult to justify such a judicial abdication to prejudice and supersti-
tion.
Since lack of veracity is evidenced by a criminal conviction, the
eradication of the latter should destroy the inference to the former, for
the pardon represents a decision of the state executive authority that the
offender has sufficiently mended his ways to warrant relief from exposure
in court of his previous deportment. It seems incongruous that the court
would stress so strongly the desirability of giving a pardoned criminal a
fresh beginning but refuse to implement that policy in its decision, espe-
cially when no Pennsylvania holding to the contrary was cited.
57
3. Time Limitations
The Pennsylvania courts have on occasion discussed the issue of how
recent past convictions must be before they may be employed to impeach
credibility. The basis for exclusion is the assumption that after a sub-
stantial period of time has elapsed, the person convicted has lost his
criminal proclivities and concomitantly his lack of credibility.
In Marshall v. Carr,58 a civil case, the supreme court asserted in
dictum that a witness' previous bad act of living in the state of fornication
with a lewd woman twenty-six years before was too remote to affect his
credibility. In Keough v. Republic Fuel & Burner Co.,59 a survival and
wrongful death action, the court concluded that the introduction of prior
convictions to affect credibility was not an absolute right in civil cases and
held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in excluding the
56 See 3 WIGmoRE, EvIDENCE §§ 979-80 (3d ed. 1940); text accompanying note
112 infra.
57 The court did cite Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316, 32 Atl. 424 (1895), which
suggested in dictum that a pardon could be introduced to affect credibility.
5s8271 Pa. 271, 114 Atl. 500 (1921).
59 382 Pa. 593, 116 A.2d 671 (1955).
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record of the defendant who had committed his last crime ten years before
at the age of nineteen. Quoting from rule 303 of the Model Code of
Evidence,60 the supreme court proceeded to point to the wide power of
the trial judge, which may indicate the court's willingness to allow trial
judges extensive discretion in restricting the use of prior convictions to
affect credibility. In a criminal case such discretion could be of crucial
significance in spearheading reform, since the prosecution cannot appeal
from adverse verdicts. While there are no criminal cases expressly affirm-
ing broad trial-court discretion in excluding old convictions, several have
stressed a general discretion in admitting evidence on the issue of cred-
ibility.61 It would seem clear that the remoteness of a prior conviction
would be an important factor in the exercise of that judgment.
The opinion in Keough should not, however, be taken to mean that
a trial judge has power to exclude all prior convictions no matter when
they occurred. This position was rejected a number of years before in
Weiss v. London Guarantee & Adc. Co.,62 an action to recover on a policy
of burglary insurance. The trial judge admitted past convictions to im-
peach the plaintiffs' credibility and subsequently charged the jury to dis-
regard their criminal records because they had paid their debt to society.
The supreme court held it to be reversible error to withdraw the prior
convictions from the jury, since the case itself rested primarily on the
credibility of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Therefore, it is unclear how
far the trial judge may go in refusing to admit prior convictions to impeach
a witness' veracity. Keough and Weiss were probably correctly decided on
their specific facts, but due to the paucity of cases, it is impossible to point
to any emergent pattern or general rule.
4. Impeachment of Perjurers
There remains in one area a vestige of the common-law rule that a
person who has been convicted of a crime is disqualified as a witness. The
Pennsylvania General Assembly has declared that a person who has been
convicted of perjury is not competent to testify unless the case involves
some injury to his person or property. 3  However, the courts have found
ways of circumventing the harshness of this act. Thus where one of
60 MoDEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 303 (1942): "(1) The Judge may in his dis-
cretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value is outweighed by the
risk that its admission will . . . (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice
or of misleading the jury .... "
01 Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 273, 145 Atl. 89, 92-93 (1928)
(dictum); Commonwealth v. Schambers, 110 Pa. Super. 61, 65, 167 AtI. 645, 646
(1933) (dictum).
62280 Pa. 325, 124 Atl. 472 (1924).
03 PA. STAT. AN. tit. 19, § 682(a) (1964) : "A person who has been convicted
in a court of this Commonwealth of perjury . . . shall not be a competent witness
for any purpose . . . unless the proceedings be one to punish or prevent injury or
violence attempted, done, or threatened to his person or property; in which cases
he shall be competent to testify."
19651
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several codefendants or conspirators is tried and found guilty of perjury,
the court could delay entry of the judgment of conviction in order to
permit him to testify against his colleagues in a separate trial.6 4 A person
found guilty of perjury by a jury, but with no judgment of conviction
entered against him, cannot have his credibility as a witness impeached by
this offense in another trial, for the courts permit impeachment only by
convictions, not by guilty verdicts or prior bad acts.a Therefore, a person
found lying under oath cannot have his credibility attacked by the very
act which would be most likely to destroy his credibility. In a very early
case a perjurer whose judgment of conviction had been held in abeyance
testified against fellow conspirators.0 8 Nothing was said about the guilty
verdict, although the superior court noted that it would have been proper
to caution the jury. Nevertheless, this case was decided several decades
before the establishment of the strict rule limiting impeachment of cred-
ibility to convictions.
67
A pardon has been held to remove the statutory disability imposed
for a perjury conviction. 68  The court, after stating its decision, added a
very cogent argument for this result: "Suppose [a perjurer] . . . was
the only witness to a murder, must justice be baffled because of his dis-
ability? And yet how is it to be removed if not by a pardon ?" 69
This decision implemented the purpose of a pardon by obliterating
the legal impediment caused by the prior conviction. However, the ques-
tion in this case was the perjurer's competence to testify, not his credibility;
thus the court did not face the issue of whether his perjury conviction
could have been introduced to impeach him.
C. Proof of Prior Convictions
In Buck v. Commonwealth,70 decided in the days before the accused
could testify in his own behalf,71 the defendant endeavored to ask a prose-
cuting witness whether he had been tried or indicted for embezzlement.
It is unclear whether he meant conviction. In any event the court declared
that the proper mode for proving a conviction to affect a witness' credibility
was by production of the record itself, for it was the best evidence. This
case was overruled in 1909 by Commonwealth v. Racco 72 which upheld
64 See Commonwealth v. Billingsley, 160 Pa. Super. 140, 50 A.2d 703, aff'd ner.
357 Pa. 378, 54 A.2d 705 (1947) ; Commonwealth v. Pearlman, 126 Pa. Super. 461,
191 Atl. 365 (1937); Commonwealth v. Lewandowski, 74 Pa. Super. 512 (1920).
65 See text accompanying notes 5-6, 18 supra.
6 6 Commonwealth v. Miller, 6 Pa. Super. 35, 41 (1897).
67 Commonwealth v. Arcurio, 92 Pa. Super. 404 (1928).
6 8Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316, 32 Atl. 424 (1895).
69 Id. at 324-25, 32 At. at 427; cf. Commonwealth v. Cannon, 386 Pa. 62, 123
A.2d 675, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 898 (1956).
70 107 Pa. 486 (1885).
71 The statute enabling a criminal defendant to testify was enacted in 1887.
PA. STAT. ANI. tit. 19, § 681 (1964).
72225 Pa. 113, 73 AtL 1067 (1909).
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the questioning of a defendant about his past convictions. The court
reasoned that since the matter was collateral, the record or best evidence
did not have to be produced, especially when the defendant himself surely
knew of what- crimes he had been convicted. Furthermore, the record
might be in a foreign state or country and thus unavailable. Racco
remained the law until the legislature intervened in 1911.
1. Act of 1911
The Act of 1911, 7s which was modeled on the English Criminal
Evidence Act of 1898, 74 prohibits an accused who takes the stand from
being asked and from being required to answer any question tending to
show that he has been convicted of or charged with a crime unless he has
put his character into issue or has testified against a codefendant. 75 The
courts have stated that the statute was apparently passed to counteract the
decision in Commonwealth v. Racco.76  It was thus designed to prevent
fishing expeditions in general, since a question may be baseless but the
7 3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1964).
74 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, § 1(f) :
A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall
not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question
tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of or been charged
with any offence other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad
character, unless-
(i) the proof that he has committed or been convicted of such other
offence is admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence where-
with he is then charged; or
(ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses
for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good character or the
nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the
character of the prosecutor or the witness for the prosecution; or
(iii) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the
same offence.
See 1 WiGMORE, EViDENCE §§ 193-94a (3d ed. 1940).
75 Hereafter any person charged with any crime, and called as a witness in
his own behalf, shall not be asked, and, if asked, shall not be required to
answer, any question tending to show that he has committed, or been
charged with, or been convicted of any offense other than the one wherewith
he shall then be charged, or tending to show that he has been of bad character
or reputation; unless,-
One. He shall have at such trial, personally or by his advocate, asked
questions of the witness for the prosecution with a view to establish his own
good reputation or character, or has given evidence tending to prove his
own good character or reputation; or,
Two. He shall have testified at such trial against a co-defendant,
charged with the same offense.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1964).
The statute is silent as to interrogation about prior crimes to show motive,
intent, and purpose, and although the English statute contained a specific section
permitting such questioning, the Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that
such questioning is allowed. E.g., Commonwealth v. Heller, 369 Pa. 457, 87 A.2d
287 (1952); Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d 307 (1944) (dictum).
76225 Pa. 113, 73 Atl. 1067 (1909); see Commonwealth v. Brown, 264 Pa. 85,
91, 107 Atl. 676, 679 (1919) ; Commonwealth v. Wiswesser, 124 Pa. Super. 251, 188
Atl. 604 (1936); Commonwealth v. Arcurio, 92 Pa. Super. 404 (1928); Common-
wealth v. John Doe, 79 Pa. Super. 162 (1922) (dictum).
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mere asking may have a very prejudicial effect, regardless of the answer.
77
Consequently, the act has been held not to prohibit the records of prior
convictions from being introduced to affect credibility.
7 8
When the defendant puts his character into issue, he has stepped out-
side the protection of the Act of 1911, and if he takes the stand, the
prosecution may interrogate him about his prior convictions if they consist
of felonies or misdemeanors crimen falsi79  Since the statute goes only
to the method of proving prior misconduct, it does not change the rules
and prerequisites for the types of crimes admissible to impeach credibility, 0
although the courts have on occasion handed down anomalous decisions.
In Commonwealth v. Yeager,"' a defendant, who had assaulted his wife,
shot and killed a state policeman when the latter tried to arrest him. At
trial the defendant called character witnesses, thus losing the protection of
the Act of 1911. The supreme court held that there had been no error in
asking him about prior arrests for hit and run driving and for illegal
possession of liquor in addition to production of the record of convictions
of these crimes to discredit his testimony. In support of these propositions,
the court cited two precedents, both of which merely stated that an accused
is no longer under the protection of the Act of 1911 when he makes his
character an issue; neither held that, as a result, prior arrests or convictions
of liquor violations or hit and run driving 8 2 were admissible to impeach
credibilityPs  In fact arrests and liquor convictions had been held inad-
missible in previous cases, the former because they are not convictions,
84
the latter because they are not misdemeanors crimen falsi.s 5
a. The Extent of Examination
The defendant can also place his character in issue by opening up the
subject of his prior convictions. The defendant might find it advantageous
to do this in order to avoid the effect of their introduction by the Common-
wealth or to show that his past crimes were quite different from the one
with which he is presently charged.8 6  Here, too, the court has permitted
7 7 Commonwealth v. Wiswesser, supra note 76.
78 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 145 AtI. 89 (1928) ; Com-
monwealth v. Anthony, 91 Pa. Super. 518, 521 (1927) (dictum). In Common-
wealth v. Socci, 177 Pa. Super. 426, 110 A.2d 862 (1955), the court held that it was
reversible error, under the Act of 1911, to read the record of the entire indictment
of a past crime.
79 E.g., Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 271-72, 145 At. 89, 91 (1928).
80 Commonvealth v. Wiswesser, 124 Pa. Super. 251, 261, 188 Atl. 604, 609 (1936).
81329 Pa. 81, 196 Atl. 827 (1938).
82 Hit and run driving is a misdemeanor. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1027 (1960).
88 Commonwealth v. Garanchoskie, 251 Pa. 247, 96 At. 513 (1916); Common-
wealth v. Pezzner, 78 Pa. Super. 286 (1922).
84 See text accompanying notes 11-17 supra.
85 See cases cited note 31 supra.
86 See Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 145 Atl. 89 (1928).
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an anomalous result. In Commonwealth v. Farley,8 7 the defendant, who
was charged with burglary and armed robbery, admitted his prior con-
victions on direct examination. His defense was that since he was on
parole, he would be unlikely to commit another crime, and that he was
suspected by the police whenever a large robbery was committed because
of the nature of his past crimes. The district attorney, over the defendant's
objection, was then allowed to interrogate him not only about the amounts
taken but also about the details of three other robberies that had occurred
years before. The court asserted that the prosecution's only purpose was
to counteract the accused's statements about his previous robberies. Such
extensive interrogation seems unnecessary, as the defendant's assertions
would seem to be adequately rebutted by confining cross-examination to
the size of the prior crimes. The only probable result of further detailed
inquiry was to inflame the jury into using the convictions as substantive
evidence of his present guilt.
Farley, moreover, never mentioned an older superior court case which
had declared:
Certainly it was not the part of the jury to go into the facts in the
former trial, for if that were so, the defendant in such a case might
offer facts in extenuation, and thus the case inquiry might be
extended at great length. All that it was proper for the defendant
to offer was the record showing the nature of the charge and the
fact of the conviction and the sentence. 8
If the details of former crimes are not relevant to an issue the
defendant has interjected, their admissibility must be based on the theory
that the more sordid or vicious the details of the prior act, the less likely
is the defendant to testify truthfully. If true, the courts should also permit
the introduction of facts such as the length of the previous sentences, for
they are often based on the sordidness and viciousness of the prior act.
Logically, then, an accused who had received a short sentence or had been
placed on probation would be more worthy of belief than someone who had
received a long sentence. Moreover, the admission of past penalties
neither involves a great amount of time nor collateral issues since they are
a matter of formal record. Yet the supreme court has refused to allow a
defendant to introduce his past sentence for this purpose.89
87 168 Pa. Super. 204, 77 A.2d 881 (1951).
8 Commonwealth v. Auerbach, 71 Pa. Super. 54, 57 (1919).
It should be noted that the defendant may be asked about his prior criminal
record if he denies having one. Here the witness has opened the door, and may be
questioned as to the veracity of his statements. See Commonwealth v. Lisowski,
274 Pa. 222, 117 Atl. 794 (1922) ; Commonwealth v. Petrulli, 182 Pa. Super. 625, 128
A.2d 108 (1956); Commonwealth v. Comer, 167 Pa. Super. 537, 76 A.2d 233 (1950).
89 Commonwealth v. Rucker, 403 Pa. 262, 265-66, 168 A.2d 732, 733, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 868 (1961); cf. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353,
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 862 (1949). The fact of the pardon may be shown. Common-
wealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 145 Atl. 89 (1928) (dictum).
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b. Remedies for Violations of the Act
The Pennsylvania courts do not seem entirely consistent as to the
proper procedure to follow when a defendant has been questioned about
his prior criminal conduct contrary to the Act of 1911. The superior court
has taken the position that the statute gives a criminal defendant a right
not to be questioned about his prior convictions, and that an infraction
of this right entitles him to a new trial even if no prejudice had resulted
as a consequence.90
However, the supreme court has apparently taken a different view
by making the question of prejudice the essential consideration. In
Commonwealth v. Davis,91 decided in 1959, the supreme court reversed a
first-degree-murder conviction because the prosecution had cross-examined
the defendant about his criminal record despite its formal introduction
and had repeatedly referred to it throughout the trial. Although there
was no opinion accepted by a majority of the court,92 the justice who
announced the court's decision emphasized that the question to be decided
was whether the defendant had been prejudiced. He then noted that the
"spirit and letter" of the Act of 1911 had been infringed:
Our disapproval of this type of cross-examination indicates
no sympathy for this defendant; it is simply a recognition of the
right under the law of every person, including this defendant, to a
fair and an impartial trial, a trial wherein his guilt or innocence
of the offense whereof he stands charged is not determined by his
past conduct or record.93
c. Necessity for Objection
When defense counsel has failed to make a timely or proper objection
to an infraction of the Act of 1911, the courts have not been as willing to
reverse and to grant a new trial. 4  In Commonwealth v. Emery, 5 the
0 Commonwealth v. Brown, 93 Pa. Super. 190 (1928) ; Commonwealth v. Pezz-
ner, 78 Pa. Super. 286 (1922); cf. Commonwealth v. Socci, 177 Pa. Super. 426, 110
A.2d 862 (1955).
91396 Pa. 158, 150 A.2d 863 (1959).92 Mr. Justice B. R. Jones wrote the opinion announcing the decision of the
court. Mr. Justice Musmanno and Mr. Justice McBride wrote separate concurring
opinions. Mr. Chief Justice C. A. Jones and Mr. Justice Bell dissented.
93 Commonwealth v. Davis, 396 Pa. 158, 163, 150 A.2d 863, 866 (1959) ; cf. Com-
monwealth v. Lyons, 283 Pa. 327, 129 Atl. 86 (1925). Compare Commonwealth v.
Varano, 258 Pa. 442, 102 Atl. 131 (1917), for the court's treatment of a nondefendant
witness:
In view of the negative answer of the witness, that matter does not seem to
be of great magnitude. Only prejudicial error will justify granting a new
trial. "It is not sufficient, as a general rule, to show that an improper ques-
tion, either in form or substance, has been put to a witness; it must appear
that an answer was received which tended to injure the case of the appellant."
Id. at 446-47, 102 Atl. at 132.94 It has been stated that on a sustained objection from the defendant's counsel,
the trial judge is not required to withdraw a juror if counsel does not so request,
but may merely strike the forbidden matter from the record. Commonwealth v.
Diagicobbe, 85 Pa. Super. 305 (1925) (dictum).
95 273 Pa. 517, 117 Atl. 338 (1922).
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trial judge took a leading role in the questioning about the defendant's
previous crimes, and his counsel failed to object until sometime after this
inquiry had terminated. The court admitted arguendo that the Act of
1911 had been infringed but refused to order a new trial because, in its
estimation, no material harm had been done to the defendant and because
the objection had come too late, citing for this point a case in which a
defendant failed to object to questions by the prosecution. 0 The defense
counsel is in a difficult position when he wishes to object to a series of
questions from the bench, for he wants to refrain from antagonizing the
judge and from hurting his client in the eyes of the jury. Whether this
situation is sufficiently distinguishable from the failure to object to the
prosecution's questions is arguable, but the distinction seems of sufficient
significance to warrant consideration in the court's opinion.
However, in Commonwealth v. Davis the defendant's counsel not only
failed to object at the trial to an infraction of the Act of 1911, but also
omitted to raise the question on appeal.97  At oral argument the court
itself introduced the issue of "whether the conduct of the prosecuting attor-
ney in his cross-examination of the defendant so seriously prejudiced the
defendant to the extent that he was deprived of a fair trial," 98 and a
majority decided that he had not waived his right to the protection of the
Act of 1911 and awarded him a new trial.9 9 It is difficult to determine
whether the use of the accused's prior convictions was more flagrant in
Davis than in previous cases. In any event the majority was certainly
more concerned with the statutory purpose of protecting defendants,
regardless of procedural errors, than the court had ever been in earlier
decisions.
The attitude of the court toward the Act of 1911 has not been uniform.
On the one hand, the court is confronted by the statute's purpose to prevent,
except under certain limited circumstances, the inherent prejudice accom-
panying any questions to the defendant about his criminal record.,00 On
the other hand, the implicit and sometimes explicit concern of a number
of the justices has been the protection of society.""' This approach is
manifested when the court examines a breach of the act to determine
whether it is a technical infraction with little or no apparent effect on the
9 6 Commonwealth v. Brown, 264 Pa. 85, 107 Atl. 676 (1919).
97396 Pa. 158, 150 A.2d 863 (1959); see Commonwealth v. Garrison, 398 Pa.
47, 52, 157 A.2d 75, 77 (1959) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
98 396 Pa. at 160, 150 A.2d at 865.
99 Chief Justice C. A. Jones and Justice Bell filed a terse dissent: "We fail to
see any impropriety, let alone reversible error, in the able district attorney's cross-
examination of the patently dissembling defendant with respect to his prior penal
servitude, already matter of trial record." Id. at 172, 150 A.2d at 870.
100 Commonwealth v. Brown, 264 Pa. 85, 107 Atl. 676 (1919); Commonwealth
v. Brown, 93 Pa. Super. 190 (1928).
101 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCoy, 401 Pa. 100, 162 A.2d 636 (1960) (Bell,
J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Davis, 396 Pa. 158, 150 A.2d 863 (1959); Com-
monwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 143 Atl. 904 (1928).
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outcome of the case, or whether it had a substantial bearing. While it
is not usually set forth in the cases in this way, the interpretation of the
Act of 1911 can almost be said to revolve around a much larger problem:
the rights of the accused versus the rights of society.
2. An Alternative Construction to the Act of 1911
It remains to be considered whether the Act of 1911 actually furnishes
further protection to the criminal defendant than the courts have allowed.
In this connection an argument could be made that the statute, with two
enumerated exceptions, should be construed to prohibit all use of prior
convictions to impeach a criminal defendant, rather than to limit only
fishing expeditions and oral examination.
In support of the court's construction, it must be noted that the statute
explicitly protects a defendant only from being "asked" and being "re-
quired to answer" questions tending to show his past crimes; 102 there
is no express prohibition of the introduction of the records of convictions.
Moreover, the courts have concluded that the statute was enacted as a
result of the decision in Commonwealth v. Racco,"1° which had departed
from prior law and raised the problem of fishing expeditions. 1°4
The statute, as limited to a mere procedural change in the method
of proving a conviction, does very little to protect the defendant. This
construction avoids fishing expeditions, but it is unlikely that these severely
hurt the accused. Baseless accusations can be denied and perhaps even
turned to the defendant's advantage by arguing "false charges and in-
nuendos" to the jury and by asking why the Commonwealth had not
produced the record or the best evidence if he had committed any past
crimes. If the accused does have a criminal past, it is doubtful whether
an admission would be more harmful than if his convictions were proved
by the introduction of the record. While these considerations are certainly
not conclusive of the legislative intent, they do become important when
it is remembered that the Act of 1911 was modeled on the English Criminal
Evidence Act of 1898,105 which, as the supreme court acknowledged in one
case, had been construed to prohibit all proof of convictions to affect
credibility except under the limited circumstances expressed in the stat-
ute.10 1 The court, however, declined to follow that authority.
Moreover, it is difficult to attribute any consistent rationale to the two
exceptions to the statute unless its general prohibition is directed to any
use of prior convictions rather than to the method of their admission.
102 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1964) ; see note 75 supra.
103 225 Pa. 113, 73 AtI. 1067 (1909).
104 See cases cited notes 76-78 spra and accompanying text.
105 61 & 62 Vict c. 36, § 1; see 1 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 193-94a (2d ed. 1940).
10 6 Commonwealth v. Dorst, 285 Pa. 232, 239-40, 132 AtI. 168, 170 (1926).
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Under the broad reading of the body of the statute, the first exception-
when a defendant has placed his character into issue-seems logical since
the prosecution is merely being permitted to rebut the defendant's conten-
tion as to his character, which has become an element in the case. A similar
logic applies to the second exception covering the situation in which a
defendant testifies against a co-defendant. The testifying defendant is
here functioning as a witness whose credibility may very likely determine
the fate of another.
On the other hand, under the existing narrow interpretation of the
statute, only the method of proof changes when the defendant comes within
the tro exceptions. Since there is no substantive change, the only con-
ceivable rationale for permitting cross-examination is that such interroga-
tion is more harmful to the defendant than the introduction of his formal
record. Thus the statute authorizes a subtle form of retribution-a means
of more effectively influencing the jury without changing the substantive
evidence. This result seems particularly anomalous in view of the admitted
difficulty in keeping juries from using unrelated criminal misconduct as
proof of present guilt.
Whatever may be the proper construction of the Act of 1911, the
Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1947 enacted a statute 10 7 declaring
that no evidence could be admitted to show that a criminal defendant had
been charged with or convicted of any previous crimes, with three excep-
tions, two of which were contained in the Act of 1911. Prior convictions,
consequently, could no longer be introduced to impeach the defendant's
veracity just because he chose to testify on his own behalf.
The Act of 1947 would have radically altered the law of evidence by
prohibiting the use of a criminal defendant's convictions to affect
credibility except under limited circumstances such as when he placed his
character into issue. Rule 21 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence reflects
substantially the same thinking, although it would permit impeachment
of a criminal defendant by his prior record only when he has affirmatively
introduced evidence in support of his own credibility. 08 The thrust of the
Act of 1947 and of rule 21 is to impede or to prevent the possible use of
previous misconduct as proof of the accused's present guilt. 10 9 Never-
theless, for reasons to be discussed later, the supreme court held this
3or pA STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1964).
108 UNIFORM RULE OF EvIDExcE 21:
Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime not involving dishonesty
or false statement shall be inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his
credibility. If the witness be the accused in a criminal proceeding, no evi-
dence of his conviction of a crime shall be admissible for the sole purpose
of impairing his credibility unless he has first introduced evidence admissible
solely for the purpose of supporting his credibility.
109 This problem of course does not arise when a witness is not a criminal de-
fendant. There is still a risk of deterring a nonparty witness from testifying because
of a desire to avoid humiliation and public exposure in litigation in which he has
no direct interest; but the Pennsylvania statutes have not spoken specifically to
this problem.
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enactment unconstitutional,110 throwing defendants back to the limited
protection given by the courts under the older statute.
II. CHARACTER AND REPUTATION
A defendant in a criminal trial may place his character in issue as
bearing on the question of guilt on the theory that a person's character is
highly relevant as to whether he might commit a crime.' He may
introduce it himself-for example, by testifying about his past record or
about his good repute in the community-or he may introduce it through
character witnesses, but the traits to which such witnesses testify must
be germane to the type of crime involved in the present case, such as the
trait of peacefulness in a murder prosecution.
1 1 2
A. Defendant as a Witness
Since the defendant may place his character into issue as evidence of
his innocence, the prosecution may then counteract this inferential proof
by showing his prior convictions, which tend to show the likelihood of
his guilt." 3 Furthermore, the Act of 1911 states that under these cir-
cumstances, the Commonwealth may cross-examine him about his past
criminal record without its formal introduction."i 4
If on direct examination the defendant denies ever having had
trouble with the law, evidence of prior arrests can be admitted to contradict
him.115 One opinion viewed this as simply the prosecution's privilege of
producing contrary evidence on a material issue." 6 Another decision
relied upon the Act of 1911, reading as an affirmative authorization the
provision that a defendant may be interrogated as to any "offense" that
"he has committed, or been charged with, or been convicted of" when he
has placed his character into issue." 7 Such a construction would mean
that whenever a defendant submitted his character as an issue, the Com-
monwealth could interrogate him about his prior arrests or prior bad acts,
even though he had never specifically alluded to arrests or any particular
act. Nevertheless, since the Act of 1911 was held to have been enacted to
11 Commonwealth v. DePofi, 362 Pa. 229, 66 A.2d 649, cert. denied, 338 U.S.
852 (1949).
Il Commonwealth v. Aston, 227 Pa. 106, 75 At!. 1017 (1910); Commonwealth
v. Cleary, 135 Pa. 64, 19 Atl. 1017 (1890); Commonwealth v. Castellana, 277 Pa.
117, 121 Atl. 50 (1923) (dictum).
112 Commonwealth v. Thomas, 282 Pa. 20, 127 Atl. 427 (1925); Commonwealth
v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343, 80 At!. 571 (1911).
"13 See Commonwealth v. Hurt, 163 Pa. Super. 232, 60 A.2d 828 (1948).
"14 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1964).
15 Commonwealth v. Comer, 167 Pa. Super. 537, 76 A.2d 233 (1950); see
Commonwealth v. Petrulli, 182 Pa. Super. 625, 128 A.2d 108 (1956) ; Commonwealth
v. Wells, 69 Pa. Super. 227 (1918).
11a Commonwealth v. Comer, supra note 115.
"17 Commonwealth v. Petrulli, 182 Pa. Super. 625, 627, 128 A.2d 108, 109 (1956).
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deal only with the method of introducing prior crimes, it should not be used
to affect the substantive rules of evidence on the questions of credibility and
character.
B. Proof Through Character Witnesses
Character, however, when introduced by witnesses, must usually be
proved through the defendant's reputation in the community rather than
by proof of specific acts in order to avoid confusion from collateral issues
and unfair surprise." 8 The defendant's character witness may then be
cross-examined as to whether he has heard about the accused's past con-
victions, arrests, and bad conduct, for these references theoretically will
enable the jury to assess the basis for the witness' opinion of the defend-
ant's reputation. The jury, of course, is not supposed to consider the
arrests or other misconduct as substantive evidence on the question of
guilt,11 9 and the court's difficult task "in each case is to determine whether
the inquiry at cross-examination is directed to the witnesses' hearing of
the rumor or is directed toward the substantive fact of the defendant's
misconduct." 120
Although the superior court has, on occasion, stated in dictum that
a character witness may be cross-examined about facts known to him about
the defendant, 2 1 the Pennsylvania courts have adhered closely to the rule
that questions to a character witness on cross-examination must not pertain
to what he himself knows about the accused but what he has heard in the
community.'2 2 Consequently, it was held to be error in one case to ask a
witness whether she knew that the defendant was living in adultery 123
and in another case for a prosecution witness called to rebut testimony of
good character to testify that the defendant had admitted killing someone
else.1'24 On the other hand, the Commonwealth has been permitted to
ask the accused's character witness whether he had heard that the defendant
had been accused of killing a man.125
Such testimony elicited from character witnesses on cross-examina-
tion involves the most blatant form of hearsay, for no evidence is permitted
on the issue of whether he actually committed all the prior bad acts which
118 See 1 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 193-97 (3d ed. 1940); 3 id. §§ 979-88.
119 Commonwealth v. Mashie, 155 Pa. Super. 419, 38 A.2d 403 (1944); Com-
monwealth v. Zimmerman, 143 Pa. Super. 331, 17 A.2d 714 (1940).
120 Commonwealth v. Becker, 326 Pa. 105, 115, 191 At. 351, 356 (1937); see
Commonwealth v. Hurt, 163 Pa. Super. 232, 236, 60 A.2d 828, 830 (1948).
121E.., Commonwealth v. Hess, 170 Pa. Super. 145, 84 A.2d 246 (1951).
'22 Commonwealth v. Becker, 326 Pa. 105, 115-16, 191 Atl. 351, 356-57 (1937);
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 282 Pa. 20, 24, 127 Ati. 427, 428 (1925) ; Commonwealth
v. Hurt, 163 Pa. Super. 232, 235-36, 60 A.2d 828, 829 (1948) ; see 3 WIGmORE, EvI-
DENCE § 988 (3d ed. 1940).
'2 Commonwealth v. Thomas, 282 Pa. 20, 127 Atl. 427 (1925) (the question
held error also because the trait of chastity was irrelevant to a proclivity to murder).
'24 Commonwealth v. Jones, 280 Pa. 368, 124 At. 486 (1924).
lu Commonwealth v. Becker, 326 Pa. 105, 191 Atl. 351 (1937).
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rumor or neighborhood gossip attribute to him. The courts of Pennsyl-
vania have never really discussed the problem except to enunciate the
formula that such interrogation is essential to test the credibility of the
character witness himself. Questioning the witness as to his knowledge
of the defendant's misconduct would eliminate the hearsay problem, but
would immediately raise the problem of collateral issues. It could be
argued that such questions as how long the witness has known the
defendant, how often and under what circumstances he has come in
contact with him and his associates, and whether he has travelled in the
same circles would probably suffice on the issue of how much weight the
jury should give to the witness' testimony.
The courts in their opinions also have not explicitly faced the issue
whether the prejudicial effect on the jury outweighs the benefit of impeach-
ing the character witness. Instead, the courts have endeavored to determine
the real, underlying purpose of the district attorney in the particular case,
rather than to concentrate on the effect which such questioning will have
on the jury generally.'1
2
III. USE IN SETTING PENALTIES
A. Act of 1925
Until 1925 death was the only penalty for first-degree murder in
Pennsylvania.m In that year the general assembly enacted legislation
giving to the jury the function of fixing sentence at death or life imprison-
ment if it returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder.1 2s This
change gave the jury needed flexibility, since it was believed that juries
were on occasion refusing to respond with guilty verdicts because of the
automatic death penalty. 2 9
1. Commonwealth v. Parker 3 0
The supreme court construed the Act of 1925 in Commonwealth v.
Parker-a case which was to have a profound effect for thirty-one years.
The court held that a confession of robberies committed subsequent to the
homicide with which the accused was charged was admissible to assist
the jury in setting the sentence under the Act of 1925.131 The court's
reasoning was that the jury, in determining the penalty, should have the
information which a trial judge would normally have in fixing the penalty,
128 See id. at 115, 191 AtI. at 356.
27 Pa. Laws, 1860, No. 382, § 75.
Ms PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963). If the jury could not decide on the
penalty, life imprisonment was to be imposed.
129 See Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 152, 143 At. 904, 906-07 (1928).
130D294 Pa. 144, 143 Atl. 904 (1928).
131 The confession was also held admissible on the alternative ground that the
subsequent robberies bore a relation to the crime for which defendant was on trial.
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and this data would include the defendant's prior criminal record. More-
over, the court held that the evidence must be introduced during the trial
proper, relying for support on the absence of any legislation expressly
authorizing split verdicts.
132
The result in Parker appeared to contain an inconsistency. The
statute said nothing about the jury receiving the accused's record during
the trial. On the other hand, the court refused to require the jury to
return its verdict before hearing additional evidence on the penalty issue
because no statute specifically sanctioned the mechanism.
There is, however, a more fundamental objection to the result in
Parker, for not only was there no statutory authorization for admitting a
defendant's criminal record during the trial, but there was a partial
statutory prohibition 133 as well as a common-law rule against admitting
past crimes as substantive evidence of guilt.18 4 The Act of 1911, if given
a broad construction, 3 5 would render all such evidence inadmissible, and
even the construction given to this act by the courts would keep such
proof out when the defendant did not testify or place his character in issue.
Thus the interpretation of the Act of 1925 in Parker denied to defend-
ants in first-degree murder cases the protection afforded by the Act of
1911.136 Although the court assumed that a jury's determination of the
penalty would be inadequate without information as to the defendant's
prior record, the sordidness and other relevant factors of the present
crime would seem to provide a sufficient basis for a sentence. Assuming,
however, the value of giving the jury the same information that a judge
would have for setting the penalty, the logical way to avoid both encroach-
ing upon the Act of 1911 and the tendency of a jury to use the record as
substantive evidence of present guilt would be to have a separate hearing
for determining the penalty. In light of the above considerations, the
court's unwillingness to act without express legislative authorization is
unconvincing.
The opinion in Parker, written for a unanimous court, seemed con-
cerned more with doing its fair share in bringing criminals to justice than
in reconciling the need for evidence with the necessity of protecting a
defendant from the prejudicial misuse of that evidence by a jury. At one
point the court noted:
The Act of 1925 was not passed to help habitual criminals, and
we take judicial knowledge of the fact that offenders of that desig-
nation have become so general that the law, not only lex scripta
132Id. at 153-54, 143 Atl. at 907. See also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 348 Pa.
349, 35 A.2d 312 (1944).
32
3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1964).
13 4 See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
135 See text accompanying notes 104-07 supra.
136 See Commonwealth v. Flood, 302 Pa. 190, 153 Atl. 152 (1930); Common-
wealth v. Dague, 302 Pa. 13, 152 Atl. 839 (1930).
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but non scripta, must advance to protect society against them.
. . . [W]here the trial judge was convinced from the confes-
sions of the defendants . . that they were habitual offenders
against society . . . we cannot say it was reversible error to
receive their full confessions in evidence, even though it is possible
that the admissions therein of other offenses may have militated
in a general way against defendants.
137
The last phrase in the above quotation indicates the court's awareness
of the risk that the jury would use the defendant's past record in assessing
guilt in the case before them, but it did not think this problem to be an
"insurmountable objection." 138 The courts in later cases believed that
they had overcome this obstacle by requiring the trial court to explain
clearly to the jury the limited purpose for which the prior crimes were
introduced.139
The basic philosophy of Parker was reaffirmed in 1932 in Common-
wealth v. Williams.140  The court conceded that the construction of the
Act of 1925 came close to violating the fundamental precept that prior
unrelated crimes cannot be used to decide the guilt of the defendant, but
asserted, nonetheless, that the interpretation of the Act of 1925 must remain
to protect society from habitual criminals: "The Act of 1925 cannot be
used as a shield to protect men who scorn the laws of society, who
murderously prey on it for profit, and who commit acts regardless of
consequences for mercenary gain." 141
However, the decision in Williams has more significance than as an
echo of Parker, for the court gave consideration to two issues not touched
upon by the earlier decision, thereby laying a foundation for an extensive
development of the law surrounding the Act of 1925.
2. Introduction of Mitigating Circumstances
by the Defendant
In Williams the defendant, who was convicted of first-degree murder,
contended that he should have been allowed under the Act of 1925 to
introduce evidence that might have influenced the jury to impose life
imprisonment instead of death. The court, however, refused to permit
the defendant to introduce mitigating circumstances because this would
lead to multitudinous collateral issues. 142  Yet, in what seemed to be
137 Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 154-55, 143 Atl. 904, 907 (1928).
138 rd at 154. 143 Ati. at 907
139 Commonwealth v. McCoy, 401 Pa. 100, 162 A.2d 636 (1960) ; Commonwealth
v. LaRue, 381 Pa. 113, 112 A.2d 362 (1955) ; Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa.
327, 184 Atl. 97 (1936) ; Commonwealth v. Harris, 314 Pa. 81, 171 At. 279 (1934);
Commonwealth v. Dague, 302 Pa. 13, 152 At. 839 (1930).
140 307 Pa. 134, 160 At. 602 (1932) (reversed on other grounds).
141 Id. at 155, 160 Ati. at 609.
'4
2 Id. at 154, 160 At. at 609.
[Voi.113:382
USE OF PRIOR CRIMES
second thoughts, the court stated near the conclusion of its opinion that
it was not holding that mitigating factors might not be allowed in the
"Cproper case," but that it was largely a matter for the trial judge's "sound
judicial judgment." 143
Only a year after the decision in Williams, the supreme court seemed
to shift its attitude toward the introduction of mitigating factors by the
defendant. In Commonwealth v. Stabinsky,'" the trial judge refused to
permit the defendant to introduce such proof and the supreme court
declared:
A rule would command little respect if it permitted the State to
show what was bad about a man for the purpose of persuading
the jury to inflict a more severe penalty, without at the same time
permitting the defendant to show that he was suffering with a
mental disease that might affect his conduct, though not in fact
insane as the term is applied in the criminal law.145
However, the court refused to reverse, declaring that the evidence
fully justified both the verdict and the penalty. In a later decision 145 in
which the defendant had sought unsuccessfully to exclude under the Act
of 1925 past crimes for which he had received suspended sentences and
probation, the court without mentioning Williams and without further
elaboration declared that the defendant may introduce "such mitigating
factors as may exist in the nature of impaired health, mental deficiencies,
state of intoxication, or other circumstances." 147
3. Further Limits on the Parker Case
The court in Williams sought in dictum to impose substantial limita-
tions upon the holding in Commonwealth v. Parker by restricting the
types of crimes that could be introduced to affect the penalty and by
restricting the kinds of cases in which past crimes could be admitted for
this purpose. Such restrictions were thought to reduce the likelihood of
undue prejudice to the accused. Under the first restriction records of
crimes such as pickpocketing, adultery, embezzlement, or perjury were
under no circumstances to be admitted on the question of penalty., 48 The
court failed to explain how it arrived at this list and why all crimes are
not relevant on the matter of sentence. Under the second limitation a
criminal record could be introduced on the issue of sentence only when
the trial judge was convinced that the present crime was committed for
143 Id. at 155-56, 160 Atl. at 609.
144313 Pa. 231, 169 Atl. 439 (1933).
145Id. at 238, 169 Ati. at 441-42.
146Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949).
147 Id. at 402, 65 A.2d at 338.
148 Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 152, 160 Atl. 602, 608 (1932).
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mercenary reasons and that the defendant was a habitual criminal, or where
the present crime was the result of "sordid passion." 149 This limitation was
imposed on the theory that the perpetrators of such crimes are those
against whom society must be protected. This case was closely followed
in Commonwealth v. Clark,150 where the defendant had been sentenced to
death for murdering the new lover of his paramour. Since the defendant
was not a habitual criminal and had not killed for a mercenary purpose, or
from a sordid motive, the court held that the admission into evidence of
his incarceration for drunkenness and his stay in a reformatory was
error 151 and granted a new trial.
Several subsequent cases, however, seemed to ignore the limitations
of Williams in admitting prior crimes on the issue of penalty. In
Commonwealth v. LaRue,1 52 the defendant had a record of only one prior
conviction and therefore was hardly a habitual criminal, although he had
stabbed the present victim numerous times following a quarrel. However,
the court did not indicate whether this was a crime of "sordid passion."
In Commonwealth v. Simmons,153 conspiracy to rob and robbery were the
only past crimes of the defendant who was convicted of felony-murder
while attempting to rob an old man. In Commonwealth v. Lowry,'54 the
defendant was involved in the perpetration of a robbery during which
several people were killed. The case itself does not enumerate the
defendant's record, although another case in referring to Lowry noted
that the defendant had four separate larceny convictions. 155 Therefore,
while it could be said that the accused was a habitual criminal and that
his crime had a mercenary purpose, the opinion did not refer to the
standards established in Williams. In Commonwealth v. Cannon,15 the
supreme court rejected the precept that the defendant had to be an
inveterate criminal or that the crime had to be one of sordid passion before
his criminal record could be used under the Act of 1925. Ignoring
Williams, but citing LaRue, Simmons, and Lowry, the court somewhat
inaccurately stated: "Neither reason nor authority limit the admissibility
of prior convictions to cases where the defendant was either a professional
criminal or his crime was one of sordid passion." 157
'149 Ibid.
150 322 Pa. 321, 185 AtI. 764 (1936).
151 Id. at 324, 185 Atl. at 765.
152 381 Pa. 113, 112 A.2d 362 (1955).
'53 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 862 (1949).
154 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953).
155 Commonwealth v. Cannon, 386 Pa. 62, 64-65, 123 A.2d 675, 677, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 898 (1956).
156 386 Pa. 62, 123 A.2d 675, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 898 (1956).
'57Id. at 64, 123 A2d at 677 (1956). The court rejected an argument that the
crime should have been excluded because the accused had been pardoned. The court
indicated that while the pardon may restore him to his civil rights, it still has value
on the issue of penalty. Id. at 66, 123 A.2d at 678.
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It has been well settled since Parker that, in addition to the records
of convictions, admissions of and confessions to unrelated crimes and
offenses could be introduced to set the penalty1 58 even though such
evidence is not admissible to impeach credibility. Since such evidence is
excluded for impeachment purposes because it raises collateral issues, it
is not apparent why the court has admitted confessions and admissions to
set the penalty, since they also raise such issues. What is more puzzling
is that the court refused to admit prior arrests on the question of penalty,159
thus following the approach taken 1o with reference to credibility.' 1'
4. Limits on Review
The supreme court has never overturned a penalty imposed by a
jury under the Act of 1925.162 In the early cases the court declined to
pass on its power to overturn such a death penalty, 1' but several years later,
in a nonjury case, indicated that it might reduce this penalty when
"justice and right required it." I" Subsequently, however, the court
decided that it had no such power.165 The court failed to explain the
basis for treating jury verdicts and nonjury verdicts differently. In view
of the greater chance of prejudice in a jury trial than in a nonjury trial,
it would seem especially incumbent upon the court to articulate its
reasoning.
In three cases where trial judges sitting without a jury have set the
penalty at death, the supreme court has remanded to have the sentence
reduced to life imprisonment. One case involved a defendant with no
previous record who shot and killed his neighbor after an altercation
between their children; 166 the second, a mother of below average intel-
ligence with a tragic marriage who had killed her illegitimate baby; lOt the
third, a defendant who was only fifteen years old when he killed a druggist
in the course of a robbery.168 If the court believed that an injustice was
158 Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353, cert. denied, 338 U.S.
862 (1949) ; Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 341 Pa. 209, 19 A.2d 288 (1941) ; Common-
wealth v. Dague, 302 Pa. 13, 152 Atl. 839 (1930); Commonwealth v. Weston,
297 Pa. 382, 147 Atl. 79 (1929).
159 Commonwealth v. Turner, 371 Pa. 417, 88 A.2d 915 (1952) ; Commonwealth
v. Jones, 355 Pa. 594, 50 A.2d 342 (1947).
160 See text accompanying notes 11-17 supra.
161 See generally Commonwealth v. Barnak, 357 Pa. 391, 426, 54 A.2d 865, 882
(1947) (Drew, 3., dissenting).
162 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 405 Pa. 456, 461, 176 A.2d 619, 621 (1962).
163 Commonwealth v. Clark, 322 Pa. 321, 185 A.2d 764 (1936) ; Commonwealth
v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 184 AtI. 97 (1936) ; Commonwealth v. Harris, 314 Pa. 81,
171 AtI. 279 (1934).
104 Commonwealth v. Hawk, 328 Pa. 417, 418, 196 AtI. 5, 6 (1938) (dictum) ; see
Commonwealth v. Taranow, 359 Pa. 342, 59 A.2d 53 (1948).
165 Commonwealth v. Smith, 405 Pa. 456, 176- A2d 619 (1962); Commonwealth
v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52, 110 A2d 216 (1955).
160 Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 Atl. 733 (1932).
107 Commonwealth v. Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941).
168 Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
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done in each of these cases, it would seem irrelevant that the penalty was
set by a panel of judges rather than by a jury. However, in view of the
compelling facts in these nonjury cases, it is not inconceivable, despite
the authorities, that even had a jury imposed the death penalty under the
facts, the court would not have sustained the verdict. Nevertheless, the
strength of the abiding faith in jury-set sentences has been manifested
further in another context. Thus even where the prosecution requested
only life imprisonment, the jury was permitted to review the accused's
criminal record to set the penalty on the grounds that the district attorney
might have changed his mind, and that, in any event, the jury was free
to disregard the prosecution's recommendation. 6 9
5. Stare Decisis
Despite adverse criticism of the construction of the Act of 1925,170
and despite the modifications of the rules established in connection with
it, the supreme court believed itself firmly bound by stare decisis, and in
case after case reaffirmed the basic principle that the accused's record
could be introduced in a murder trial in order to aid the jury in fixing
the penalty. Finally, in Commonwealth ex rel. Norman v. Banmiller,
171
the court stated emphatically that it would not overrule its construction of
the Act of 1925 and that any change should come from the legislature.
Mr. Justice Musmanno dissented, urging the court to set its own house
in order.'72 Several of the justices composing the majority had previously
been critical of the Parker decision. Mr. Chief Justice Jones, dissenting
in Commonwealth v. DePofi,'78 had animadverted upon the construction
of the Act of 1925, and Mr. Justice Bell, writing for the court in Common-
wealth v. Lowry,' 74 had done likewise. In addition Mr. Justice Benjamin
Jones, writing for the court in Commonwealth v. Thompson,'7 5 seemed
3
6 9 Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953) ; accord, Common-
wealth ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle, 411 Pa. 497, 192 A.2d 381 (1963).
170 Commonwealth v. Davis, 396 Pa. 158, 164-66, 150 A.2d 863, 866-67 (1959)
(Musmanno and McBride, JJ., concurring); Commonwealth ex rel. Norman v.
Banmiller, 395 Pa. 232, 240, 149 A.2d 881, 884 (1959) (Musmanno, J., dissenting);
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 389 Pa. 382, 405, 133 A.2d 207, 219 (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 849 (1957); Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa.
594, 603, 98 A.2d 733, 737 (1953) (opinion by Bell, 3.); Commonwealth v. DePofi,
362 Pa. 229, 249, 66 A.2d 649, 658 (C. A. Jones, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
852 (1949); see United States ex rel. Scoleri v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 (1963) (under the particular facts of the case,
application of the Parker rule violated due process of law); cf. Commonwealth v.
Butler, 405 Pa. 36, 47, 173 A.2d 468, 474 (1961) (opinion by Eagen, J.).
171395 Pa. 232, 149 A.2d 881 (1959).
172 Id. at 240, 149 A.2d at 884; see Commonwealth v. Thompson, 389 Pa. 382,
405, 133 A.2d 207, 219 (Musmanno, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 849 (1957).
173 362 Pa. 229, 249, 66 A.2d 649, 658, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 852 (1949). Sub-
sequently, he wrote the court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Niemi, 365 Pa. 105,
73 A.2d 713.(1950), which followed and accepted Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa.
144, 143 Atl. 904 (1928).
174 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953).
175 389 Pa. 382, 401, 133 A.2d 207, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 849 (1957) (quotation
omitted in A.2d).
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also to indicate his opposition to Parker, by quoting Mr. Justice Bell's
statement in Lowry. At the time of Norman, therefore, four of the six
justices 118 of the supreme court had expressed themselves to be opposed
to the practice of introducing prior convictions in murder cases for the
sole purpose of enabling the jury to fix the penalty. Yet at least three of
these justices apparently thought that the court should not repudiate
thirty-one years of judicial construction, and their position was sufficient
to keep Parker from being overruled. Shortly after the case was argued,
Mr. Justice McBride joined the court,1 77 and in a subsequent dissent
criticized the interpretation of the Act of 1925,178 thus putting five
179
of the seven justices on record as opposed to the present state of the law.
B. Act of 1947
In 1947 the general assembly enacted a statute prohibiting in criminal
trials the introduction of the defendant's past crimes with three specific
exceptions: when he testified against a co-defendant, when he attempted
to establish his reputation or character, or when the past crimes were
related to "guilt or the degree of the offense wherewith he is then
charged." 180 This legislation appeared to revolutionize the law pertaining
to the use of prior convictions.
The superior court in Commonwealth v. Robinson'"" was the first
appellate tribunal to construe this statute. The defendant, charged with
rape and burglary, claimed that a reference by the prosecuting witness to
her identification of the defendant from police photographs violated the
Act of 1947, apparently on the ground that it tended to show a prior
criminal record. The court, in affirming, indicated that no infraction had
occurred since this evidence was relevant to the question of guilt and
thus came within the third exception. "What is struck at [by the Act
176 There was one vacancy on the court at the time Bawniller was argued.
177 Mr. Justice McBride was appointed to the court on December 6, 1958. 95
RIcHEY, THE PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL 1058 (1962).
178 Commonwealth v. Davis, 396 Pa. 158, 166, 150 A.2d 863, 867 (1959) (dis-
senting opinion).
179 Mr. Chief Justice C. A. Jones and Justices Bell, Musmanno, B. R. Jones,
and McBride.
180 Pa. Laws 1947, No. 1239, § 1. The statute read as follows:
In the trial of any person charged with crime, no evidence shall be ad-
mitted which tends to show that the defendant has committed, or has been
charged with, or has been convicted of any offense, other than the one
wherewith he shall be charged, or that he has been of bad character or
reputation unless-
One. He shall have at such trial, personally or by his advocate, asked
questions of the witness for the prosecution with a view to establish his own
good reputation or character, or has given evidence tending to prove his
own good character or reputation; or,
Two. He shall have testified at such trial against a co-defendant, charged
with the same offense.
Three. The proof that he has committed or has been convicted of such
other offense is admissible evidence as to the guilt or the degree of the
offense wherewith he is then charged.
181163 Pa. Super. 16, 60 A2d 824 (1948).
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of 1947] is affecting the credibility of a testifying defendant by proof of
some other offense." 182
Despite the superior court's lack of difficulty with the statute, the
supreme court, in Commonwealth v. DePofi, 8 3 found it to be a vague and
confusing piece of legislation. The trial court had admitted a list of
sixteen prior convictions for the purpose of affecting the penalty on the
theory that "degree of the offense" in the third exception meant "heinous-
ness of the offense" or "grade of punishment." 184 On appeal the defendant
challenged the propriety of this procedure under the Act of 1947 on the
ground that the third exception permitted the introduction of past crimes
only if they showed motive, intent, or pattern for the present crime.
The supreme court conceded that there was no justification for the
trial court's interpretation of the statute, and that logic supported the
defendant's contention. However, the court was concerned that if the
defendant's construction were adopted, their long established interpretation
of the Act of 1925 would be nullified, since crimes would no longer be
admissible to affect the penalty in first degree murder cases. The opinion
reasoned further that the jury's determination of the sentence would be
largely arbitrary without the accused's record, and since no statute specifi-
cally permitted the jury to consider the matter of penalty separately from
the issue of guilt, a split-verdict procedure could not be instituted as a
solution to the problem.
The court went on to point out that a semicolon separated exceptions
one and two, but a period separated two and three, and it was therefore
unclear whether the third clause was really intended as an exception to
the broad prohibition of the statute, or whether it was meant to be an
independent provision, in which event it would raise problems of due
process. Because the statute was so vague and indefinite for the above
reason, the supreme court declared the Act of 1947 unconstitutional.
The Act of 1947 was also held void under article III, section 3 of the
Pennsylvania constitution 185 because the title of the act did not clearly
express what the statute contained. The court asserted that since the
legislation purported to be such a "radical departure from the law estab-
lished for nearly a quarter of a century" 186 the title ought to indicate it.
Mr. Justice C. A. Jones dissented.187 He thought the statute and
the legislative intent to be perfectly evident, interpreting the third exception
to exclude all past crimes unless they dealt with motive or intent. He
182 Id. at 23, 60 A.2d at 827.
183 362 Pa. 229, 66 A2d 649, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 852 (1949).
18 4 Id. at 236-38, 66 A.2d at 653-54.
185 "No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more
than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."
186 Commonwealth v. DePofi, 362 Pa. 229, 247, 66 A.2d 649, 658, cert. denied,
338 U.S. 852 (1949).
18 7 Id. at 249, 66 A2d at 658.
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concluded also that the title was sufficiently explicit since the purpose of
the constitutional requirement was to insure that the title would give
notice of the subject matter of the statute and not to contain a compact
summary of everything in the legislation.
It is difficult to accept the court's conclusion that the statute was so
nebulous and uncertain that it must be declared inoperative, particularly
since the court itself was able to reject the lower court's interpretation
and to concede that the defendant's construction was logical. The court
was reluctant to give the statute its logical meaning, for the consequence
would have been to overturn the law developed around the Act of 1925.
While it is true that the Act of 1947 did not explicitly sanction split-verdict
procedure, it would seem to be the natural result, if the constitutionality
of the statute could thereby be upheld. The court in Commonwealth v.
Parker 88 had no reluctance about imposing a workable superstructure
upon the Act of 1925 by admitting prior crimes to affect the penalty during
the trial itself. However, the result in Parker was generally an aid to the
prosecution, while a split-verdict system superimposed on a valid Act of
1947 would have given added protection to the defendant. In holding the
statute inoperative because of difficulties with first-degree murder cases,
the court denied the protection of the act to the great majority of criminal
defendants who are not charged with first-degree murder and who are
therefore not subject to a jury-imposed sentence.
The majority apparently desired to be absolutely certain of the legis-
lature's intent to effect a far-reaching change in the use of unrelated prior
convictions before bestowing its sanction, especially when the consequence
would be to extend further protection to criminal defendants. The court,
in fact, almost seemed to bend over backwards to find some excuse to
nullify the statute and preserve the status quo.18 9
C. Split-Verdict Act of 1959
In 1959, the same year that the supreme court declared in Common-
wealth ex rel. Norman v. Banmiller ' 9 0 that it was for the legislature to
remedy the construction of the Act of 1925, the general assembly enacted
what is popularly known as the Split-Verdict Act.19 ' Under this statute,
188 294 Pa. 144, 143 Atl. 904 (1928).
189 Cf. Commonwealth v. Davis, 396 Pa. 158, 150 A.2d 863 (1959); Common-
wealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953).
190 395 Pa. 232, 149 A.2d 881 (1959).
191 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963). The statute provides in part:
In the trial of an indictment for murder, the court shall inform the jury that
if they find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, it will be their
further duty to fix the penalty therefor, after hearing such additional evidence
as may be submitted upon that question. . . . After such verdict [of first
degree murder] is recorded and before the jury is permitted to separate, the
court shall proceed to receive such additional evidence not previously received
in the trial as may be relevant and admissible upon the question of the penalty
to be imposed upon the defendant, and shall permit such argument by counsel,
and deliver such charge thereon as may be just and proper in the circum-
stances. . . . A failure of the jury to agree upon the penalty to be imposed,
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the jury in capital cases must first determine guilt and then hear additional
evidence relating solely to penalty before fixing the sentence at death or
life imprisonment.
The court refused to apply the act retroactively to cases tried before
but appealed after the legislation had been passed. 1 2  A majority con-
cluded in one case that the "soundness" of the statute did not require the
court to apply it in such a manner and that the court therefore was bound
by the Statutory Construction Act which provides that no law shall be
construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by
the legislature. 1 3 The opinion also expressed concern that if the act were
applied retrospectively, the jails would open up for "hundreds of con-
victs." 194 Mr. Justice Bok in a dissent asserted that the "interests of
justice" 195 required a new trial and that the legislature was correcting
the judicial misconstruction of its will in the Parker case. Furthermore,
he denied that the jails would open up for countless criminals by distin-
guishing final from tentative judgments.
Another important issue raised by the Split-Verdict Act of 1959 was
the kind of evidence to be admitted in the penalty hearing. In Common-
wealth v. McCoy,'9 6 the trial judge allowed the prosecution to produce the
victim of a prior unrelated robbery to describe the defendant's vicious
manner. The supreme court first rejected the prosecution's contention
that the act was intended to enlarge the rules for admitting evidence on
the issue of the penalty, for, so interpreted, the act was thought to violate
the Pennsylvania constitution for failing to express clearly the subject of
evidence in its title.197  Consequently, the rules developed under the Act
of 1925 as to kinds of evidence that could be introduced to affect the
sentence were still controlling, the only difference being that such evidence
was no longer to be received during the trial of the question of guilt. The
court added that the introduction of evidence such as the testimony of a
former victim must be excluded because it would interject "collateral and
diverting issues." "Is Nevertheless, the court held that it was harmless
error in this case, and that the jury would have imposed the death penalty
anyway.
In another case the court held that defense counsel's failure to object
to the admission of evidence at the penalty hearing precluded raising this
shall not be held to impeach or in any way affect the validity of the verdict
already recorded, and whenever the court shall be of opinion that further
deliberation by the jury will not result in an agreement upon the penalty to
be imposed, it may, in its discretion, discharge the jury . . . in which event
if no retrial of the indictment is directed, the court shall sentence the defend-
ant to life imprisonment ....
192 Commonwealth v. Rucker, 403 Pa. 262, 168 A.2d 732, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
868 (1961); Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 399 Pa. 110, 160 A.2d 215 (1960).
113 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 556 (1952).
'94 Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 399 Pa. 110, 135, 160 A.2d 215, 228 (1960).
195 Id. at 148, 160 A.2d at 234.
196405 Pa. 23, 172 A.2d 795 (1961).
197 PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.
198 Commonwealth v. McCoy, 405 Pa. 23, 32, 172 A2d 795, 799 (1961).
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objection on appeal. 1 9 As a result, evidence such as comments about the
defendant made by judges in earlier proceedings and also a statement by
the judge in the present case that the defendant was a "cold-blooded
stick-up man and a menace to society" 20 0 were admitted against defendant,
even though the court admitted that they should have been excluded.
The opinion in McCoy set forth the proper procedure to be used at
such hearings, stating that the prosecution should be limited to prior
convictions, confessions, and admissions. As to evidence in mitigation,
the court stated: "The only evidence adduceable by the defendant would
be such as might impeach the records introduced against him, and such
other evidence as is directly, and not collaterally, relevant to the issue of
penalty and is not repetitious of any evidence that appeared of record in
the trial of the issue of guilt." 201
However, the court left open the question of the proper remedy if
the procedure were not followed and if the error were prejudicial. It
would seem unlikely that the tribunal would order a new trial, for the
error would be solely on the question of penalty. Yet the language of the
court suggests this possibility had the error been prejudicial: "The testi-
mony of the witness to the prior robbery was clearly harmless, in con-
templation of law, and its admission does not warrant a new trial."
202
Furthermore, it would be difficult and awkward to assemble another
jury solely to determine the question of sentence anew. The new jury
would know little more about the present case than the fact that the
accused was found guilty, as there would be no way of knowing what
proof the prior jury had accepted as true and what proof they had rejected.
Another possibility would be to treat the situation as if the jury's intent
cannot be determined 203 and to reduce the penalty to life imprisonment, a
procedure recommended by the dissenting justices in McCoy 2 04
'99 Commonwealth v. Butler, 405 Pa. 36, 173 A.2d 468 (1961).
2 00 Id. at 54, 173 A.2d at 477.
201 Commonwealth v. McCoy, 405 Pa. 23, 35, 172 A.2d 795, 800 (1961). Com-
pare Commonwealth v. Rucker, 403 Pa. 262, 168 A.2d 732, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 868
(1961), decided earlier the same year. The court there stated that such information
should be given to juries so that
they should be able intelligently to fix the penalty, and, to that end, that they
ought to know what manner of man it is upon whom they are being asked
to impose sentence,-his criminal proclivities, his demonstrated attitude
toward law and order, and, on the other hand, such mitigating factors as
may exist in the nature of impaired health, mental deficiencies, state of
intoxication, or other circumstances.
Id. at 267, 168 A.2d at 734.
2 0 2 Commonwealth v. McCoy, supra note 201, at 32, 172 A.2d at 799.
203 [A] failure of the jury to agree upon the penalty to be imposed, shall not
be held to impeach or in any way affect the validity of the verdict already
recorded . . . in which event, if no retrial of the indictment is directed, the
court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment upon the verdict
theretofore rendered by the jury.
PA. STAT. ANN. it. 18, § 4701 (1963).
204 Commonwealth v. McCoy, 405 Pa. 23, 36, 172 A.2d 795, 801 (1961).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the general rule that unrelated prior convictions may not be
used as substantive evidence against a defendant, there are a number of
ways of putting such convictions before a jury, thus subjecting criminal
defendants to the risk of misuse of this evidence. While the courts of
Pennsylvania have occasionally sought to alleviate exposure to this risk, they
for the most part have adhered closely to stare decisis and seem to have
expected any major change to come from the general assembly. With
the rules of evidence concerning prior convictions undergoing scrutiny
and the rights of the criminal in general undergoing reevaluation through-
out the Nation, the courts of this Commonwealth have not discussed recent
trends and seem genuinely reluctant to expand the protection given to
defendants at trial.
Harvey Bartle, III
